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Labour mobility is a key geopolitical issue 
in the Pacific region and has been in the 
background of Australia’s political agenda 
since 1984 when it was first flagged in the 
Jackson Review of Australian aid. Labour 
mobility is regarded as a key mechanism 
for regional integration, for enhancing the 
development potential of countries in this 
region (http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/
spacific/pacer/index.html) and is central 
to regional trade negotiations. It is regarded 
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within the region as pivotal to Australia’s 
relationship with the Pacific, which could be 
one by which Australia’s relations with the 
Pacific will be judged in the next few years 
(Yourn 2007:59).
Since the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis in the 
early 1970s, labour-deficit countries have 
increasingly imported temporary labour 
from the developing world. Typically, 
labour-importing countries are either 
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industrialised, largely Western nations with 
ageing populations and increasingly acute 
labour shortages or countries with rapidly 
growing economies such as in the Middle 
East and in some parts of Asia. Rarely, 
however, have labour-importing countries 
given priority to protecting the rights of 
imported labour or to the development 
outcomes of a labour-export strategy.
The New Zealand Recognised Seasonal 
Employer (RSE) Scheme and Australia’s 
Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme 
(PSWPS) are substantial steps towards 
greater regional integration of labour 
markets in the Pacific region (AusAID 
2009:84) and developing labour migration 
schemes based on workers’ rights and 
positive development goals. Potentially, the 
schemes provide a mechanism for meeting 
the predicted labour shortages and to create 
positive economic development impacts in 
labour-sending countries.
This article focuses on the Australian 
demand side of the equation and reveals 
that these objectives, while admirable, are 
also far from straightforward. The article 
examines the structure of both schemes, 
but with greater emphasis on the Australian 
pilot, as little has been written about it thus 
far.1 The discussion seeks to contextualise 
the PSWPS within a broader analysis of the 
labour market dynamics in the Australian 
horticultural sector and canvasses some 
explanations for the poor performance 
(in terms of much lower uptake than 
expected) of the pilot, in contrast with the 
New Zealand RSE scheme. It concludes by 
emphasising that there are several factors 
that will affect the viability and growth of 
the PSWPS—such as the greater political will 
that will need to be exerted in the sensitive 
area of deporting at least some segments of 
what appears to be a structurally embedded 
illegal labour force in Australian horticulture 
and reducing the rigidities in the labour 
recruitment and employment system.
The New Zealand RSE scheme
The New Zealand government established 
the RSE scheme in April 2007 (Hugo 2009:13). 
The RSE scheme was developed by the New 
Zealand government to meet the heavy 
seasonal labour demands of employers in 
the horticultural and viticultural sectors 
of the New Zealand economy, particularly 
during peak harvesting, planting and 
pruning times. It is also considered an 
important mechanism for meeting New 
Zealand’s foreign policy objectives.
While the New Zealand government has 
permitted 11 Pacific Island Forum member 
countries access to its labour market on a 
seasonal basis, bilateral agreements have 
been negotiated with five priority ‘kick-
start’ country governments—Kiribati, 
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu—with 
the understanding that arrangements will 
be reviewed periodically (Luthria 2008). 
Fiji was removed from the list of preferred 
countries after the December 2006 military 
coup (M. Klapdor, 2008, ‘New Zealand’s 
seasonal guest-worker scheme: background 
note’, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/
pubs/BN/200708/NZSeasonalWorker.
htm). The first workers from these five 
countries began work in New Zealand in 
2007.
The RSE scheme has grown rapidly. 
Initially, 5,000 visas were made available to 
Pacific island workers each year under the 
RSE scheme. In the first full season of the RSE 
scheme (2007–08), 126 employers employed 
2,883 overseas workers. Of these, 83 per cent 
came from the five kick-start states, with the 
majority from Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu 
(2,247) (IMSED Research 2009:4). By June 
2008, the number of RSE workers had grown 
to 5,079 (Ramasamy, Krishnan, Bedford and 
Bedford 2008) and by 2009 the number had 
increased to approximately 8,000.
The RSE policy represents a major 
departure in immigration policy for New 
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Zealand and allows a great deal of flexibility 
in worker recruitment and labour supply 
mechanisms. It is estimated that seasonal 
fluctuations in demand for workers in 
horticulture and viticulture can be as high 
as 20,000 to 30,000. Similar to the Australian 
scheme on paper, under the RSE scheme, 
where no suitable New Zealanders are 
available for work, workers can be recruited 
internationally to meet this demand, with 
preference given to the five kick-start 
states. Under the RSE scheme, Pacific island 
workers can remain in New Zealand for 
up to seven months at a time (and for nine 
months for workers from the more distant 
countries, Kiribati and Tuvalu, because they 
have higher travel costs). Where workers are 
unable to be recruited from Pacific island 
countries, employers can source workers 
from other countries (Hugo 2009:13). As a 
result, in 2009, up to 25 per cent of workers 
under the RSE scheme came from Asia.
A key feature of the structure of the RSE 
scheme is that it helps to regularise worker 
recruitment in these industries, which, before 
the scheme, were characterised by high levels 
of undocumented workers. In order to create 
labour demand from the outset, the New 
Zealand government conducted immigration 
raids to deport undocumented workers. 
While there was initial resistance by many 
New Zealand employers to a regularised 
labour supply system, evaluation of the RSE 
found that most RSE employers believed that 
participating in the RSE and having a secure 
and reliable labour supply outweighed the 
costs, resulted in productivity increases, 
improved the ability to produce at the ‘high 
end’ of the market and gave producers 
greater business confidence, resulting in 
increased levels of business investment 
(IMSED Research 2009:8).
Labour supply mechanisms and structure 
of the RSE scheme
Under the RSE scheme, the recruitment and 
employment of temporary/seasonal workers 
is a highly individualised, employer-driven 
model whereby the New Zealand farmer 
is the direct employer and often the direct 
recruiter of Pacific seasonal workers. The 
RSE employer is also responsible for the 
provision of pastoral care to seasonal 
workers, which evaluation research has 
found to be a grey area of responsibility 
with wide-ranging levels of employer 
engagement.
In order to hire workers under the 
scheme, employers must first apply to 
the New Zealand Department of Labour 
for recognition as a Recognised Seasonal 
Employer. In order to gain recognition, 
businesses must be a New Zealand employer 
and meet a range of conditions (M. Klapdor, 
2008, ‘New Zealand’s seasonal guest-worker 
scheme: background note’, http://www.
aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BN/200708/
NZSeasonalWorker.htm). Once recognised, 
employers must apply for an Agreement to 
Recruit (ATR). Under an ATR, an employer 
is able to recruit workers directly from 
participating countries or may choose 
to obtain workers through recruitment 
agents in source nations.2 Employers 
have a number of obligations: to pay half 
the travel costs; provide pastoral care, 
accommodation, basic health care and 
local transport; and contribute to funds for 
locating workers who overstay at the end of 
their employment (Hugo 2009:14). The fact 
that workers can return in the next season 
for further employment is believed to have 
resulted in a low rate of overstaying, with 
less than 1 per cent of workers overstaying 
visas between April 2007 and January 2009 
(IMSED Research 2009:9).
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Under this model, individual workers’ 
rights can be marginalised. This is because 
of the degree of control that employers have 
over workers who are non-nationals and 
who therefore are in a weaker position to 
have knowledge of, and make claims over, 
their labour rights. While the high rate of 
return of workers from the first 2007–08 
season for the 2008–09 season is 55 per cent 
(IMSED Research 2009:9), which is clearly 
positive, the fact that almost half of the 
workers did not wish to return indicates a 
substantial degree of worker dissatisfaction 
with some aspects of the RSE. Evaluation of 
experience in the first season found that there 
were concerns about the fairness of salary 
deductions and the degree of employer 
control over these, particularly concerning 
accommodation costs and the development 
of dispute-resolution mechanisms (IMSED 
Research 2009:9). This research found that 
‘pay deductions impacted negatively on 
some worker–employer relationships, 
leading to distrust and disillusionment on 
the part of some workers’ (IMSED Research 
2009:6).
In his research on the first season of the 
RSE scheme, Maclellan (2008:20) found that 
there had been disputes between seasonal 
workers and employers across a range of 
issues—such as poor housing, lack of work 
at down times (which meant no income but 
continuing expenses for housing and food), 
contracts being set on a ‘piece rate’ basis (for 
example, per bin or per tree) at minimum 
wage rates rather than ‘market rates’ and 
the contentious issue of deductions where 
workers might be told the gross rate of pay, 
but not fully informed of all deductions by 
employers to cover housing, transport costs 
or airfares. Maclellan (2008:20) writes
Initially, the RSE scheme mandated 
that any deductions from workers’ 
pay couldn’t take the hourly rate 
below the minimum wage [NZ$11.25 
an hour]. However after industry 
lobbying, this provision was later 
amended to allow employers to 
deduct for half the airfare below the 
minimum wage if the full airfare was 
initially paid by the employer. This 
highlights the contentious issue of 
deductions which is common across 
the horticulture industry—workers 
may be told the gross rates of pay, 
but not informed of all deductions by 
employers to cover housing, transport 
costs or recouping airfares.
Ultimately, the extent of worker 
exploitation is contingent on the extent 
of government regulations of deductions, 
labour inspections and compliance 
monitoring of employers.
While there have been obvious concerns 
about the initial functioning of the RSE scheme, 
it is important to maintain perspective. From 
the perspective of employers, there have been 
clear productivity gains from having a reliable 
labour supply (IMSED Research 2009:8). The 
extent of these gains is reflected in the rate at 
which the scheme has expanded. From the 
perspective of workers, sending communities 
and nations, there is evidence that the scheme 
is generally pro-poor, although the degree 
of benefit is not spread evenly throughout 
sending countries (Gibson, McKenzie and 
Rohorua 2008; McKenzie, Garcia Martinez 
and Winters 2008). However recent research 
indicates there have been some unanticipated 
negative impacts on productivity and even 
in diet and health in some sending country 
communities, (Rohorua, Gibson, McKenzie 
and Garcia Martinez 2009). This finding 
as well as evidence from countries with 
substantial experiences of labour migration 
(Ball 2009) reveals that migration is always 
highly selective and that development 
outcomes are not as straight forward as often 
presumed by labour sending countries and 
aid donors alike.
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Situating the PSWPS: the demand 
for labour and undocumented 
workers in the Australian 
horticultural sector
The Australian horticultural sector 
has a growing reliance on a temporary 
international labour supply.3 The nascent 
development of the PSWPS needs to be 
viewed in this context. While the demand 
for workers in Australian agriculture has 
been declining in general terms, there has 
been a high employment growth rate in 
the more labour-intensive horticultural 
sector (Australian Productivity Commission 
2005:97; National Farmers Federation 2006). 
The Australian Farm Institute has estimated 
that the number of horticultural farm 
businesses increased by 6 per cent in the 
10 years to 2003 and the number of people 
employed in horticultural industries across 
Australia has increased by more than 40 per 
cent to approximately 68,000. The National 
Farmers Federation (2008) estimated that 
there would be a need for an additional 
100,000 workers in agriculture in coming 
years.
Primary producers in Australia’s 
agricultural and horticultural sectors rely on 
legal and undocumented (‘illegal’) workers 
to meet seasonal labour needs. The legal/
documented workforce is wide ranging. It 
includes itinerant farm labourers, family 
members, local casual workers, students 
(including overseas students), grey nomads 
(retirees travelling around Australia) and 
working holiday makers (Hanson and Bell 
2003; Shorten 2006:7). Seasonal agricultural 
work is based largely in remote locations, 
described as ‘hot, hard and dirty’, often 
poorly paid and of low social status. These 
conditions are generally unattractive to 
Australian citizens, particularly as workers 
are often paid on a piece-work or short-term 
casual basis (Millbank 2006:11).4
It is extremely difficult to obtain estimates 
of illegal workers by nationality. What is 
known is that the undocumented workforce 
consists of unauthorised residents not 
showing up in Department of Immigration 
and Citizenship records (primarily from 
the Pacific islands,5 Southeast Asia and 
China), overseas students working in 
excess of permitted hours, Australians 
working while in receipt of benefits, foreign 
travellers working without authorisation 
(Mares 2005; Shorten 2006:7) and people 
working on forged documents (‘Illegal 
meatworkers to be deported’, ABC Rural, 13 
March 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/rural/
news/content/200903/s2515173.htm). 
One in four growers in the Murray Valley 
surveyed in 2005 by Mares (2006) admitted 
to employing ‘illegals’—that is, visa over-
stayers or people working outside their visa 
conditions. Research has indicated a high 
Tongan presence in the harvest workforce 
(Mares 2005, 2006; Henderson 2004). The 
high degree of dependence on illegal 
workers and the urgency of the labour 
shortage in horticulture are reflected in the 
frequent calls from politicians and industry 
bodies for short-term amnesties on illegal 
workers (‘Council to crack down on illegal 
workers’ camps’, ABC News, 27 October 
2004, http://www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2004/10/27/1228897.htm; ‘Fed MP 
calls for amnesty for illegal workers’, ABC 
AM, 6 February 2004, http://www.abc.net.
au/am/content/2004/s1039291.htm) so 
they can be allowed to stay in Australia.
It is difficult to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the extent of illegal 
employment practices in this industry, by 
virtue of its illegality, and caution needs to 
be applied to the anecdotal nature of the 
figures available. Although estimates of 
the number of illegal workers employed 
in this sector vary considerably, neither 
industry nor government is disputing their 
importance or widespread existence. For 
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example, Hunt Sharman from the Australian 
Table Grape Association claimed that there 
were between 40,000 and 70,000 illegal 
people across Australia (‘Fruit growers 
call for amnesty on illegal farm workers’, 
ABC Rural, http://www.abc.net.au/rural/
news/stories/s1072710.htm, accessed 27 
March 2009). In 2000, the then Immigration 
Minister, Philip Ruddock, claimed that 
there were about 50,000 international 
tourists overstaying their visas working in 
horticulture (‘Itinerant workforce sweating 
over changes by Ruddock’, Radio National, 
21 August 2000, http://www.abc.net.au/
pm/stories/s165927.htm). Over-stayers are 
concentrated in particular towns: there is a 
culture of hiding workers in major regional 
centres such as Griffith, Robinvale and 
Bundaberg. It is in these regions that the 
PSWPS aims to supply labour. For example, 
in Shepparton in Victoria, it was estimated 
that 4,000 workers (of 10,000 in total) were 
employed on tourist visas each harvest 
season (‘Itinerant workforce sweating over 
changes by Ruddock’, Radio National, 21 
August 2000, http://www.abc.net.au/pm/
stories/s165927.htm). While Immigration 
Department raids have received high-profile 
media attention, rarely are employers 
prosecuted for employing illegal workers 
(‘CFMEU says illegal workers a serious 
problem’, The World Today, 1 April 2005, 
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/
content/2005/s1336240.htm).
Illegalities in the horticulture industry 
concern not only who is employed but under 
what conditions they are employed. In 
horticulture, where there can be substantial 
variations in profit margins, some primary 
producers fail to offer adequate wages and 
conditions, contributing to labour supply 
problems in the industry (Mares 2005:3). 
There have been serious attempts by the 
horticultural industry to lobby government 
to lower labour costs through the supply 
of temporary migrant workers. Although 
unsuccessful, some Australian fruit growers 
have sought to bring in 10,000 Chinese 
workers to pick fruit (Mares 2005). The 
role of unscrupulous labour brokers is 
also problematic: through the use of illegal 
employment contracts, they secure large 
profits by paying workers well below the 
award wage and claiming the award wage 
from the grower. Mares (2005) and Rule 
(2009) report that the seriousness of the 
labour shortage in horticulture has meant 
that growers are increasingly turning to 
labour-supply contractors who provide 
them with teams of undocumented workers, 
although the extent of this practice remains 
unclear.
The PSWPS 
Australia announced at the Pacific Islands 
Forum meeting in August 2008 that four 
Pacific island countries had been selected 
to be involved in a pilot labour mobility 
program. This announcement was widely 
welcomed by Pacific island communities 
after many years of lobbying. For instance, 
in 2001, the Pacific Island Forum Countries 
(excluding Australia and New Zealand) 
signed the Pacific Islands Countries 
Trade Agreement (PICTA) in order to 
promote regional integration into the 
global economy and to lay the groundwork 
for the establishment of a single regional 
common market. Trade in goods and 
labour services was considered the major 
vehicle for economic development and 
regional integration, based on the view that 
labour and skill shortages would be met 
from within the region (Peebles 2005:124). 
The PSWPS is regarded in the Pacific as a 
major increase in the level of commitment 
Australia has to engagement with its Pacific 
island neighbours.
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While the political decisions behind 
the countries selected for the pilot remain 
unclear, the countries involved in the 
Australian pilot scheme are Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Kiribati and Papua New Guinea . In terms 
of regional balance, this equates to one 
Micronesian and one Polynesian country 
(both of which have migration histories 
and experience) and two Melanesian 
nations (neither of which has had significant 
international emigration). The first three 
countries have participated in the New 
Zealand RSE program since 2007.
The Australian labour mobility pilot 
scheme has two main objectives (Hooper 
and Strasiotto 2009). First, it will contribute 
to economic development in the Pacific 
through remitted income, employment 
experience and training gained in Australia. 
From a Pacific island country perspective, 
the development orientation of the scheme is 
regarded as being critical and encompassing 
many potential benefits to individuals, 
families and communities in sending 
nations, particularly as remittances are 
more important than foreign aid for some 
of the nations in this region. Second, it 
targets areas of unmet labour demand in the 
Australian horticultural industry.6
The Australian pilot is structured into 
two main phases. Under phase one, up to 
100 visas were made available and 56 were 
issued: 50 to Tongan and six to ni-Vanuatu 
seasonal workers (in February and April, 
respectively). For phase two, which began 
in July 2009 and finishes in June 2012, up 
to 2,400 visas have been made available. 
For the 2009–10 stone-fruit harvest season, 
which runs approximately from October to 
March, it appears that (at the time of writing) 
perhaps 30 Pacific workers will be brought 
in under the pilot. This is the second harvest 
season under the pilot when very few or 
perhaps even no Pacific seasonal workers 
will be brought into Australia, despite the 
enormous importance of this initiative for 
filling labour shortages in horticulture and 
the potential that this labour supply model 
has to be expanded into other labour-deficit 
segments of the Australian economy. Some 
explanations for this will be canvassed later 
in this article.
The arrival of the first workers under 
the Australian pilot was delayed by 
several months, reflecting the complexity 
of the process and the poor preparedness 
of Australian and labour sending country 
government agencies for coping with 
these complexities in terms of developing 
new policy, bureaucratic processes and 
procedures. 
It was initially announced that the 
first workers would begin work at two 
locations (Swan Hill, Victoria, and Griffith, 
New South Wales) by Christmas 2008. The 
first intake of 50 workers from Tonga did 
not arrive, however, until mid February 
2009, and workers from Vanuatu arrived 
soon thereafter. It is unknown when the 
first workers from Kiribati will arrive; the 
expectation is that this will occur during 
2010. At present, negotiations concerning 
Australian–PNG arrangements for the 
pilot are continuing. It is only after the 
Memorandum of Understanding has been 
signed that PNG workers will be able to 
work in Australia under this scheme. It is 
expected that labour demand will increase 
during 2010 and the hopes of an expanded 
PSWPS will be realised.
The structure of the PSWPS
The Australian model of recruitment differs 
from the New Zealand RSE scheme. Under 
the Australian model and in the first phase 
of the pilot, four labour-hire companies 
have been selected by the Australian 
government to recruit and supply workers 
to farmers. In contrast with the RSE scheme, 
these companies, rather than individual 
farmers, act as the workers’ employers. 
These companies have signed a special 
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program agreement with the Australian 
government (http://www.workplace.
gov.au/workplace/Individual/Migrant/
LabourHireCompanies.htm). The process 
for growers to access workers under this 
scheme is as follows
Australian horticulture growers in 
any region of Australia can apply for 
access to Pacific seasonal workers. 
Growers may apply even if they are 
not sure of the number of workers they 
require. Applying to participate in the 
Pilot does not commit a grower to 
hosting any Pacific seasonal workers 
during the Pilot. Any grower who 
applies to access Pacific seasonal 
workers will need to demonstrate 
that they have first tried to recruit 
Australian workers.
Approval to access Pacific seasonal 
workers under the Pacific Seasonal 
Worker Pilot Scheme will only occur 
where growers demonstrate to the 
Australian Government they have 
tested the local labour market. This 
means that they have taken reasonable 
steps to first recruit Australians and 
are willing to commit to participate 
in labour market programs for the 
training and career development 
of Australians, particularly income 
support recipients, Indigenous 
Australians and Humanitarian job 
seekers. 
Once approved, growers can then 
negotiate an agreement with one of 
the approved labour hire companies 
to manage the recruitment and 
placement of Pacific seasonal workers. 
(http://www.workplace.gov.au/
workplace/Individual/Migrant/
LabourHireCompanies.htm) 
The design of the PSWPS has taken 
into account the concerns of Australian 
unions to protect Australian workplace 
standards by protecting the Pacific seasonal 
workers themselves. The involvement of 
Australian unions in discussions regarding 
the structure of the scheme demonstrates a 
clear government intention for this system to 
be worker friendly, in terms of the protection 
of migrant workers’ rights and in the 
maintenance of Australian labour market 
workplace standards and conditions.
Under the PSWPS, approved labour-
hire companies or approved employers 
are the employers of Pacific seasonal 
workers. The employer places workers 
with eligible growers. As part of being 
an employer, the employer is required to 
enter into a deed of agreement with the 
Department of Employment, Education 
and Workplace Relations and a special 
program agreement with the Department 
of Immigration and Citizenship (www.
workplace.gov.au/pswps). Both these 
agreements establish a range of obligations 
relating to the treatment and welfare 
of Pacific seasonal workers in terms of: 
worker recruitment; on-arrival assistance; 
conditions of employment; working with 
government; and requirements on departing 
Australia (Hooper and Strasiotto 2009).
The parameters governing the PSWPS 
set by the Australian government are clearly 
structured to protect the rights of workers. 
Under the pilot, employers are required 
to provide to workers: an average of 30 
hours’ work a week for six months (relevant 
industrial instrument); transparency of wage 
deductions; twenty-four-hour phone contact 
number of employer; responsibility for and 
clear methods of pastoral care provision; 
personal protective equipment; worker 
participation in Australian government-
funded training while in Australia; and 
assisting workers to comply with their visa 
conditions (Hooper and Strasiotto 2009). 
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The conditions relating to transparency 
of wage deductions and pastoral care are 
measures that have been put in place to 
address some of the problems found in the 
initial operation of the RSE scheme.
In addition to employment rights, the 
Australian pilot seeks to provide workers 
with training in skills relevant to their home 
countries. This is part of the development 
focus of the PSWPS. Under the Australian 
pilot, it is intended that workers be provided 
with access to a range of skills training 
in financial literacy, basic literacy and 
numeracy (AusAID 2009). The first PSWPS 
workers in 2009 received first-aid training 
and this training has enhanced access to 
basic medical care in some of their home 
communities.
As in the case of New Zealand, in 
Australia, employment under this scheme 
is strictly seasonal and circular. Part of 
the rationale for this international labour 
provision model is that it allows workers 
to stay connected with their families and 
communities (AusAID 2009) and thereby 
provides strong incentives for remitted 
income to be spent in labour-sending 
households and communities. It is also 
highly selective, with requirements clearly 
reflected in the criteria for visa eligibility, 
including that workers must be in prime 
working age and health and of good 
character. Workers are allowed to work 
under the scheme for seven months in any 
12-month period and are permitted multiple 
entries during this period. They are able to 
return to work in Australia in future years 
if they comply with visa conditions and 
they are required to maintain private health 
insurance during their stay. As with the New 
Zealand scheme, in Australia, workers are 
required to pay for half their international 
travel costs, accommodation and other living 
expenses while in Australia. In terms of 
restrictions, workers are limited to working 
with approved employers. Family members/
dependents cannot accompany workers and 
there is no pathway to residency or permanent 
migration (Hooper and Strasiotto 2009).
Key issues affecting the 
Australian pilot
The PSWPS is situated in one the sectors 
of the Australian labour market in 
which employment conditions are most 
marginalised and these constitute a clear 
disincentive for Australian nationals to 
seek employment in it.7 From an industry 
standards perspective, a strong argument 
could be made that the PSWPS is a key 
mechanism for ‘cleaning up’ substandard 
employment practices in the horticultural 
sector.8 The pilot appears to be structured 
around precautionary principals: starting 
small scale, located in a limited number of 
districts and, in so doing, with sufficient 
flexibility to refine policy and program 
delivery before the large-scale program 
begins.
The PSWPS is very tightly controlled, in 
contrast with the New Zealand model, which 
provides individual farmers or collectives of 
employers greater flexibility. The Australian 
government has tried to closely regulate the 
scheme in its efforts to minimise risks of 
adverse outcomes, including exploitation 
of workers. These tight controls could be 
making the PSWPS unnecessarily rigid and 
uncompetitive.9 Initial farmer uptake of 
workers in the PSWPS has been poor despite 
claims of acute worker shortages. Although 
it is too early to draw strong conclusions, 
the following brief discussion canvasses a 
range of factors that could help explain the 
small farmer uptake.
The global financial crisis
As a result of the global financial crisis, labour 
shortages do not appear to be as acute as 
before the crisis. For example, stakeholders 
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have reported increased availability of 
visiting holidaymakers as workers. There 
has also been increased availability of 
domestic workers in horticulture as a result 
of the restructuring of rural businesses 
(for example, the sale of Barter Chicken 
resulted in 1,000 worker redundancies in the 
horticultural hub of Griffith), redundancies 
and reduced labour demand in the capital 
cities. In comparison, the RSE scheme was 
well established before the global financial 
crisis and the demand for Pacific seasonal 
workers does not appear to have softened 
in New Zealand.
The size of the pilot and economies of scale
There are diverse views about the size 
of the pilot and the very small numbers 
of workers brought into Australia thus 
far. For example, one view is that these 
very small numbers are insufficient to 
test the broad appeal of a seasonal labour 
program, even in one district. Further, the 
limited scale of the pilot and uncertainty 
about its future could have resulted in 
farmer reluctance to invest in taking on 
workers and training them in horticultural 
skills when they are not confident that 
workers will be able to return. Historically, 
harvesting in Australian horticulture has 
been characterised by significant numbers 
of pickers returning to the same farms each 
season. Other stakeholders maintain that the 
small numbers of workers have provided 
an opportunity to test and refine the labour 
facilitation and pastoral care systems and 
community consultation mechanisms that 
will enable a quick scaling up when labour 
demand increases.
The labour-hire company model
There are a number of concerns about the 
rigidity of the labour-hire company model. 
For example, international experience with 
the labour-hire company approach is that this 
model in a significantly expanded scheme 
could lend itself to worker exploitation 
by cutting wages (directly or indirectly), 
thereby substantially increasing labour-
hire company profits and marginalising 
workers. While there would be monitoring 
of employment under an expanded 
scheme, we have already seen widespread 
exploitation of temporary migrant workers 
such as international students and other 
workers employed under the 457 visa, 
despite monitoring by immigration and 
labour authorities.
Another concern is whether this model 
will be sufficiently responsive to fluctuations 
in the demand for labour and whether 
a minimum of six months’ continuous 
work is too onerous a requirement for one 
labour-hire company/employer, particularly 
given the sometimes very large distances 
between major horticultural districts and 
the logistical difficulties associated with this. 
One possibility for a more responsive labour 
supply system could be through the expansion 
of the labour-hire company model to include 
farmers’ collectives10 that are regionally 
based (as in New Zealand, where workers 
are sometimes shared between farmers). 
The close management of workers required 
under this model, with small numbers of 
workers employed over vast distances, would 
inevitably affect the cost effectiveness and 
perhaps the quality of service delivery of 
the labour-hire company.
Undocumented migrant workers and 
impacts on the pilot
A serious structural impediment to the 
expansion of the PSWPS is the extent to 
which the large presence of undocumented 
workers in horticulture has impacted on 
the demand for workers under the PSWPS. 
Unless the issue of the large numbers of 
undocumented workers—spanning a 
wide range of wages and conditions in the 
horticultural industry—is addressed, there 
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is great potential for a growing number of 
jobs to be filled by undocumented workers, 
given their established networks in often-
closed communities and their central role in 
labour supply in particular regions (Mares 
2006; Rule 2009).
Is there sufficient political will to 
create demand for legal labour-supply 
mechanisms in the Australian horticultural 
sector? If the Australian government is 
committed to regularising labour supply 
in horticulture through the PSWPS, 
employment conditions in the sector 
will need to be stringently monitored 
by the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, the Department of Employment, 
Education and Workplace Relations and 
unions. To support compliance monitoring, 
immigration raids will be needed to send a 
message to illegal labour-supply contractors 
that these methods will no longer be tacitly 
accepted.
Role of government: stakeholder 
perspectives
Stakeholders have expressed two major 
concerns about the role of government in 
establishing the structure of the PSWPS. 
First, that the Australian government was 
unprepared for the complexity of establishing 
an international seasonal labour supply 
system. In particular, that there was poor 
Australian government knowledge of the 
highly complex issues surrounding seasonal 
labour supply systems and lack of capacity 
and readiness to set up the bureaucratic 
structures and bilateral mechanisms needed 
to cope with establishing the PSWPS within 
the very short initial time lines of only five 
to six months of the announcement of the 
pilot (August 2008). A second major concern 
is that the national government is creating 
rigidities in the labour supply system for 
Pacific seasonal workers due to high levels of 
centralised bureaucratic control—a situation 
that could be improved by decentralisation 
of management of the PSWPS to labour-
receiving districts, perhaps through local 
advisory bodies.
Lack of clarity over workers’ wages and 
conditions
While government articulation of the 
conditions of employment of the workers 
under the industrial award system is quite 
clear, the implementation and monitoring 
of the program by the Department of 
Employment, Education and Workplace 
Relations has been problematic in the initial 
phase. This has been due to the complexity 
of Australian industrial agreements, which 
vary by state and employment sector. 
The conditions under which seasonal 
workers in the PSWPS are employed can 
vary considerably—by state and by the 
employment model preference (for example, 
permanent versus casual contracts) of 
labour-hire firms that act as the workers’ 
employers. Problems have also arisen due 
to differences in the most suitable payment 
mechanism. For example, before the scheme 
began, the Federal Government negotiated a 
framework employment agreement with the 
peak body representing labour-hire firms. 
Under this agreement, seasonal labourers 
were to be given all the rights of permanent 
employees, even though they would be in 
the country for only seven months. Within 
one week of the first seasonal (Tongan) 
workers arriving in Australia, there was 
discord over the type of employment 
contract under which the workers were 
employed (‘ACTU says Pacific workers not 
being paid their full entitlements’, ABC Radio 
National, 2 June 2009, www.radioaustralia.
net.au/asiapac/stories/200906/s2587586.
htm). The first employer of workers under 
the PSWPS, the Tree Minders labour-hire 
firm, claimed the 50 Tongans would be 
employed only as casual workers and if 
there was no work they would not be paid 
(‘Seasonal workers’ scheme hits hurdle 
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over employment status’, ABC News, 23 
February 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/
news/stories/2009/02/23/2499319.htm). 
After this, the employment contract was 
changed to a casual work contract11 with an 
average of 30 hours a week guaranteed pay, 
which would provide the workers higher 
total wages than if they were employed 
under a permanent employment contract. 
Subsequently, workers under the PSWPS 
have been employed under permanent 
and casual work contracts. A related issue 
raised by stakeholders is: what is the most 
appropriate mechanism for workers to 
be paid? For example, one stakeholder 
expressed the view that an hourly rate did 
not encourage productivity or provide 
workers with the incentive to work hard so 
they could earn more money, in the same 
way that a piece rate may do.
One possible explanation for low 
demand and the difficulties experienced 
by labour-hire companies seeking to place 
workers is the higher wage costs of seasonal 
workers relative to market rates, particularly 
given the high numbers of undocumented 
workers present in the labour market. The 
Department of Employment, Education and 
Workplace Relations’ web site emphasises 
that these workers are not a cheap option. 
The cost of PSWPS workers to employers is 
often about $2 an hour above the relevant 
award rate. The higher cost of immigrant 
labour does not, however, appear to have 
affected the expansion of the RSE scheme, 
with the higher costs apparently being 
offset by productivity gains. It therefore 
seems that the system of documented 
protection of temporary workers’ labour 
rights in Australia is still evolving and is 
not separate from employment practices 
in the sector more broadly. The compliance 
of all employers in this sector will need to 
be monitored by government, unions, the 
Australian Federal Police and the Workplace 
Ombudsman, as the PSPWS becomes more 
established and the numbers of workers 
significantly expand.
Conclusion
The PSWPS presents an opportunity to clean 
up employment practices in the horticultural 
industry and to restrict temporary labour 
migration to a particular region: Pacific 
island countries. A variety of factors have 
compromised the expansion of the PSWPS
thus far, such as rigidities in the labour supply 
model and the extent of responsibility of risks 
borne by the labour-hire companies. As well, 
the extensive presence of undocumented 
workers in horticulture and the impact 
of the global financial crisis, has created 
a downward pressure on the demand for 
labour.
While the PSWPS remains small, its 
significance far outweighs its numbers. 
Australia and New Zealand have ageing 
populations and low rates of unemployment; 
both countries’ unskilled and skilled labour 
shortages will substantially increase in the 
future. Ageing populations also mean that 
there is growing demand for health and 
service workers (AusAID 2009). Australia 
and New Zealand, like many highly 
industrialised nations, need to begin putting 
in place well-articulated strategies to meet 
these labour shortages. The supply of 
seasonal workers to both countries begins 
to fulfil this need; the strategy for Pacific 
regional integration is also central to this. 
Embracing contract labour migration from 
the developing world by Australia and 
New Zealand at one level is only catching 
up with global trends in international 
labour supply—and expanding the labour 
supply options that have historically 
relied on permanent migration pathways. 
While in Australia, the Temporary Skilled 
Working Visa (no. 457) offers a mechanism 
for meeting skilled worker shortages; 
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the PSWPS represents the beginning of 
initiatives in Australia for meeting unskilled 
worker shortages on a seasonal basis. It is 
time now for Australia to have a debate over 
the relationship between migration, the free 
movement of people and meeting it’s future 
national labour needs, while balancing these 
with the development needs and aspirations 
of its Pacific Island neighbours.  Similarly, 
in the Pacific Region it is also time now for 
a debate about how international labour 
migration/mobility may be used to achieve 
individual country’s development goals, as 
this relationship is contentious and not as 
straightforward as often assumed.
The goal of the PSWPS is to meet unmet 
labour demand from the international labour 
market, but it is doing this with an important 
difference. As a partner in development, 
Australia is developing the PSWPS through 
respecting workers’ rights, enabling greater 
capital flows into Pacific island countries 
and focusing on skills development. While 
discussion of the development side of the 
PSWPS is beyond the scope of this article 
(see Ball 2009, Forthcoming), this aspect is 
also an important component of Australian 
assistance to Pacific island countries. The 
PSWPS is making an effort to offer these 
workers employment conditions that are 
built on respect for workers’ rights, rather 
than offering the kinds of marginalised 
employment conditions that too often occur 
in international labour migration schemes. 
In all these respects, the structuring of the 
RSE scheme and the PSWPS should be 
applauded.
Having said this, there is a long way 
to go for Australia to develop a scheme for 
labour-hire companies and farmers that 
is sufficiently flexible and keeps workers’ 
rights at the forefront of policy. An odd 
counterpoint to this scheme is the existence 
of tens of thousands of illegal workers in 
this sector. The lack of political will on this 
issue has translated into compromised 
immigration and labour regulation of 
illegal workers in horticulture, which, 
paradoxically, is undermining the expansion 
of the PSWPS and the institution of a 
regulated international labour supply for 
this sector. If Australia wishes to address 
its increasing labour shortages based on 
recognition of workers’ rights, it must 
address illegal labour supply systems or 
else there is the potential for the PSWPS 
to not achieve its laudable objectives. 
Ahead of the RSE scheme, New Zealand 
sought to clean up illegal labour supply 
in its horticultural and viticultural sectors, 
which created sufficient labour shortages to 
stimulate demand for a regularised labour 
supply for the RSE scheme. The next step 
for Australia is to do the same, to allow 
this important scheme to expand for the 
benefit of Australia and its Pacific island 
neighbours. If Australia is successful in 
this complex task, the Australian model 
could set new international benchmarks for 
temporary labour migration schemes based 
on development partnerships and respect 
for source nations and their workers.
Notes
1 Ball (forthcoming) examines the labour 
demand and supply dynamics surrounding 
the PSWPS and participating Pacific island 
countries. Part of this article is derived from 
this longer work.
2 From the perspective of development 
outcomes, one of the issues surrounding 
the direct recruitment model is that while 
recruiting from specific communities can 
be efficient from an employer’s perspective, 
it might not be equitable from a labour-
sending country’s perspective in terms of 
the distribution of benefits. Under the RSE 
scheme, employers have found it efficient 
to develop long-term relationships with 
workers and the communities from which 
they come. While community-to-community 
labour supply recruitment systems can 
AuStrAliA’S PAcific SeASonAl Worker Pilot Scheme And itS interfAce With the 
AuStrAliAn horticulturAl lAbour mArket: iS it time to refine the Policy?
127
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
have many benefits—for example, in the 
establishment of cohesive work groups and a 
sense of mutual obligation—how this system 
impacts more broadly on development 
objectives and outcomes in the longer term is 
clearly an area requiring continuing research 
and evaluation.
3 While it is beyond the scope of this article 
to examine the range of mechanisms to 
supply workers sourced internationally to 
the Australian labour market, there are many 
irregularities surrounding these international 
labour supply systems. Australia has 4.6 
million non-citizens entering the country 
each year, 500,000 of whom have work 
rights. It is estimated that currently there 
are 600,000 workers on 457 visas. For 
example, the Deegan Review (Deegan 2008) 
on Visa Subclass 457 (the Temporary Skilled 
Migration Program) highlighted some 
concerning trends in the application of this 
temporary working visa scheme, which had 
relevance to how the PSWPS is administered 
and regulated. There is evidence of increasing 
frequency of employers breaching the 457 
scheme, with the number of formal warnings 
issued increasing from 99 in 2005–06 to 1,353 
in 2007–08. Sanctions of employers violating 
the scheme also rose significantly from three 
in 2005–06 to 192 in 2007–08 (AMWU 2008). 
It is unclear whether this increase reflects 
higher numbers of visas issued in later years 
or a shift in regulation of migrant working 
conditions. In addition, the Department 
of Immigration and Citizenship’s figures 
showed that 80 per cent of 457 tradespeople 
were earning at least $10,000 less than local 
tradespeople (AMWU 2008). From a union 
perspective, the application of the 457 visa 
works to undercut wages and conditions 
in the Australian labour market. One of the 
Deegan Report’s recommendations was to 
abolish the minimum salary level in favour 
of market rates of pay for all temporary 
visa holders on salaries less than $100,000 
(DIAC 2009), underpinned by Australian 
awards and industrial instruments. This 
recommendation, while providing more 
flexibility in the labour market, could also 
work to undercut employment conditions. 
4 Workers in this sector are the lowest paid 
workers in the economy (Shorten 2006:5–6), 
with full-time employed agricultural and 
horticultural labourers earning almost one-
third less on average than other low-skilled 
workers ($598 a week in May 2004 compared 
with $868 a week for all full-time, non-
managerial employees) (ABS 2005).
5 According to Hugo (2001), Tonga and Samoa 
ranked in the top 10 countries of origin in 
terms of their rate of overstaying relative to 
the total number of entrants into Australia 
from each country. This indicates that there 
is a culture of visa violation among workers 
from these two Pacific island countries 
and substantiates claims that Pacific island 
workers are significant components of the 
undocumented labour force in Australian 
horticulture.
6 The possible achievement of these two 
broad aims through a labour export scheme 
is highly contested. Ball (2009) has written 
a critique of the migration–development 
relationship in the context of the Australian 
government’s promotion of the PSWPS as 
a mechanism for development in Pacific 
island nations. This review identified critical 
research gaps in the international literature, 
particularly concerning the relationships 
between gender, remittance behaviour and 
development; knowledge gaps concerning 
the impacts of international labour mobility 
on families and communities; the importance 
of the role of technology in facilitating 
transnational relationships; and the role of 
social remittances, particularly knowledge 
transfers and political impacts.
7 The rural sector is one of the four major areas 
of employment of undocumented workers in 
Australia; the other three are the hospitality, 
sex and industrial manufacturing sectors 
(Shorten 2006).
8 For example, the Australian Workers 
Union (AWU) has found that a significant 
proportion of Victoria’s fresh-fruit crop is 
picked by undocumented workers who are 
highly vulnerable to exploitation and in 
some cases are offered wages as low as A$3 
an hour. In addition, primary producers are 
vulnerable to immigration raids that can have 
a devastating effect on output during highly 
sensitive harvest periods (Shorten 2006:7). 
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Such raids have been widely reported in the 
media and have led to a call for amnesty for 
illegal workers (for example, ‘Council to crack 
down on illegal workers’ camps’, ABC News, 
27 October 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/
news/stories/2004/10/27/1228897.htm; ‘Fed 
MP calls for amnesty for illegal workers’, ABC 
AM, 6 February 2004, http://www.abc.net.
au/am/content/2004/s1039291.htm; ‘CFMEU 
says illegal workers a serious problem’, The 
World Today, 1 April 2005, http://www.abc.
net.au/worldtoday/content/2005/s1336240.
htm; ‘Illegal meatworkers to be deported’, ABC 
Rural, 13 March 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/
rural/news/content/200903/s2515173.htm).
9 The evaluation of the PSWPS at the 18-month 
mark will undoubtedly provide more insight 
into this issue.
10 While organisations or collectives that meet 
the criteria outlined in the ‘expressions of 
interest’ document on the Department of 
Employment, Education and Workplace 
Relations’ web site are allowed to become an 
‘approved employer’ under the pilot, why have 
collectives of farmers not elected to do so?
11 The Australian government did not alter its 
arrangements with the approved employer 
to enact this change. It was allowed under 
the deed that was in place before the PSWPS 
workers arrived in Australia.
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